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I.   INTRODUCTION 
As we celebrate the centennial anniversary of the U.S. federal in-
come tax and look forward to the next hundred years, it is worth re-
flecting on the nature of tax scholarship. The U.S. tax system is in-
comprehensibly complex. Any attempt to assess the U.S. tax system 
must therefore rely on applying some theoretical frame. Which 
frames are chosen, and how they are applied, potentially has first-
order consequences for how we understand the role of the income tax 
as a central component of the U.S. system of governance. 
The two most important frames that have been used to assess the 
income tax over the past hundred years are comprehensive tax base 
theory1 and optimal tax theory.2 Both of these approaches have    
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall). Many 
thanks to Joe Dodge, Brian Galle, Jacob Goldin, Andrew Hayashi, James Hines, Doug 
Kahn, Jeff Kahn, Stacie Kinser, Shruti Rana, Chris Sanchirico, Darien Shanske, Larry 
Zelenak, and other participants of the “One-Hundred Years of the Federal Income Tax” 
Symposium at Florida State University. 
 1. See, e.g., Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax 
Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967) (discussing comprehensive tax base theory); Joseph A. 
Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1967) (same). 
 2. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS (2008) 
(providing an overview of optimal tax theory); BERNARD SALANIÉ, THE ECONOMICS OF TAX-
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generated powerful insights. Yet both of these approaches also have 
serious limitations.3   
Over the past few decades, optimal tax theory has come to domi-
nate tax scholarship in both economics departments and elite law 
schools. A number of strands of recent scholarship have thus at-
tempted to address some of the limitations of optimal tax theory as it 
has traditionally been employed. One of the most prominent of    
these recent scholarly trends is the study of questions related to     
tax salience.4 
In a recent Article, Darien Shanske and I reviewed the developing 
literature on tax salience.5 When we began the project that led to 
that article, we were hopeful that the literature on tax salience could 
be applied to illuminate a number of conundrums plaguing both fed-
eral and state and local tax policy. However, we ultimately concluded 
that the literature on tax salience is not yet sufficiently developed to 
be applied in making concrete recommendations for practical tax   
policy problems. 
Building on that article, this Essay—written for Florida State 
University’s symposium on the 100th anniversary of the federal in-
come tax—evaluates how the literature on tax salience should be ad-
vanced in order for it to guide more effectively tax policy over the 
coming decades. In particular, this Essay analyzes potential limiting 
factors to the operation of observed tax salience effects.  
To date, most of the empirical literature on tax salience has fo-
cused on demonstrating the existence of specific tax salience effects 
within particular contexts. Building on these empirical studies, most 
of the normative scholarship engaging with tax salience has been 
based on extrapolating from the discrete instances of tax salience ef-
ATION (2d ed. 2011) (same). 
 3. For discussions of the limitations of optimal tax theory (as it has traditionally 
been employed), see, for example, James Alm, What is an “Optimal” Tax System?, in TAX 
POLICY IN THE REAL WORLD 363 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1999); Christopher Heady, Optimal 
Taxation as a Guide to Tax Policy: A Survey, 14 FISCAL STUD. 15 (1993); Alex Raskolnikov, 
Accepting the Limits of Tax Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523 (2013). 
 4. For a definition of tax salience, see David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Es-
says on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 23 (2011) 
(“As we use the term, ‘tax salience’ refers to the extent to which taxpayers account for the 
costs imposed by taxation when the taxpayers make decisions or judgments. The concept of 
tax salience is thus meant to abstract from taxpayers’ values or preferences with respect to 
taxation—from how the taxpayers might wish to account for tax costs were they not subject 
to cognitive limitations. Our concept of tax salience would be meaningless in a world of 
complete information in which taxpayers had unlimited time and resources and were not 
subject to any cognitive biases. Thus, our concept of tax salience is meant to capture any 
systematic differences between how taxpayers would perceive the costs of taxation in this 
hypothetical world of perfect economic rationality and how taxpayers actually perceive the 
costs of taxation in the real world.” (footnote omitted)). 
 5. Id. 
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fects observed in these empirical studies. Only a handful of scholars 
have attempted to develop more systematic theories for how tax sali-
ence might operate.6 Yet in the absence of more systematic theories, 
we cannot predict with any confidence how tax salience effects might 
operate outside of the specific empirical contexts in which they have 
been observed. Only after analyzing potential operative mechanisms 
and limiting factors should we apply the developing literature on tax 
salience to broad questions of tax policy.  
I should note at the outset that the purpose of this Essay is not to 
critique the existing scholarship on tax salience. Conducting empiri-
cal studies to demonstrate the existence of tax salience effects within 
specific contexts is a necessary first step for developing more general 
theories.7 Rather, the intent of this Essay is to point out that more is 
needed before the tax salience literature can offer a useful guide with 
respect to the complexities of real-world policy. 
Most importantly, normative scholars should not assume that a 
tax salience effect that is demonstrated to occur within one set of 
particular circumstances will necessarily manifest when circum-
stances differ. This Essay evaluates potential limiting factors to the 
operation of tax salience effects, such as the size of the tax liability, 
taxpayers learning from experience, and taxpayers’ aversion to being 
manipulated. These limiting factors have the potential to prevent tax 
salience effects that are shown to occur in one set of circumstances 
from manifesting in scenarios where these limiting factors are 
strongly present. 
Ultimately, in order to develop a broader theory capable of pre-
dicting the conditions under which tax salience effects are likely to 
prove important, we must develop a better understanding of the op-
erative mechanisms underlying tax salience. To this end, the litera-
ture on tax salience must move beyond offering a list of biases and 
must seek instead to provide a theory of cognition (or of social reason-
ing or of whatever else might underlie observed tax salience effects).  
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part II provides background by 
briefly summarizing the portions of my previous article with Darien 
Shanske upon which this Essay builds. Following that background, 
Part III evaluates three potential operative mechanisms that might 
underlie observed tax salience effects. Part IV then analyzes three 
potential limiting factors that might prevent tax salience effects from 
 6. And these attempts have been limited to applications of the bounded rationality 
paradigm. See infra Part III.A.  
 7. Indeed, I have conducted research of this sort myself; see Andrew T. Hayashi, 
Brent K. Nakamura & David Gamage, Experimental Evidence of Tax Salience and the La-
bor-Leisure Decision: Anchoring, Tax Aversion, or Complexity?, 41 PUB. FIN. REV. 203 
(2013). 
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occurring in circumstances under which these limiting factors are 
strongly present. Part V concludes.  
II.   BACKGROUND 
One of the central contributions of my prior article with Darien 
Shanske was to argue that market salience and political salience 
should be considered distinct concepts.8 In our terminology, “market 
salience” refers to when tax salience effects occur with respect to 
market decisionmaking (for example, consumer purchasing), and “po-
litical salience” refers to when tax salience effects occur with respect 
to political judgment formation (for example, individual voting).9 We 
argued that market salience and political salience often work in op-
posite directions.10 Factors capable of “reduc[ing] market salience 
may increase political salience, and vice versa.”11 
Much of our article was devoted to evaluating normative argu-
ments that have been made about the policy implications of tax sali-
ence.12 This Essay does not primarily build on that discussion of  
normative arguments, but rather seeks to further develop our conclu-
sion that “the existing empirical findings on both forms of tax sali-
ence  are tentative. . . . [W]e cannot currently predict with any confi-
dence how tax-design techniques affect tax salience within real-            
world environments.”13   
Yet before proceeding to develop this conclusion by evaluating 
possible operative mechanisms and limiting factors, it is necessary to 
first briefly summarize the overview we provided in that article of 
hypotheses about tax salience in the existing literature.14 Readers 
 8. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 54-59. 
 9. For further discussion, see id. at 24-25. 
 10. Id. at 54-58. 
 11. Id. at 54. 
 12. Id. at 60-98. 
 13. Id. at 22-23.  
 14. The remainder of this Part summarizes portions of my prior article with Darien 
Shanske. Elaboration on and support for all of the statements made in the remainder of 
this Part can be found in that prior article, id. at 22-54. Since its publication, there have 
been a number of important developments in the literature on tax salience. Due to space 
and scope constraints, I will not review those developments in this Essay. Particularly 
noteworthy recent additions to the literature include: STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, TAX FAIRNESS 
AND FOLK JUSTICE (2013); Lilian V. Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable De-
duction: An Introduction to Hypersalience, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1307 (2012); Brian Galle,      
Carrots, Sticks, and Salience, 66 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224160; Jacob Goldin & Tatiana 
Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Cigarette Tax Salience and Regressivity, 5 AM. ECON. 
J.: ECON. POL’Y 302 (2013); Jacob Goldin, Note, Sales Tax Not Included: Designing Com-
modity Taxes for Inattentive Consumers, 122 YALE L.J. 258 (2012); Andrew T. Hayashi, The 
Legal Salience of Taxation (Sept. 14, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2151867; Daniel Reck, Taxes and Mis-
takes: What's in a Sufficient Statistic? (July 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available 
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who are already familiar with the empirical literature on tax salience 
may wish to skip the remainder of this Part, so as to begin reading 
with this Essay’s contributions to the literature in Parts III and IV. 
A.   Market Salience 
Taxpayers do not always fully factor the price effects of taxation 
into their market decisions.15 Two categories of market salience—
spotlighting and ironing—examine two different hypotheses for how 
taxpayers may respond to complicated or obscured tax prices. 
1.   Spotlighting  
Spotlighting involves taxpayers focusing only on certain compo-
nents of an aggregate price and thereby underestimating the aggre-
gate price.16 Most observed spotlighting behavior results from a sepa-
ration of the tax assessment from the market decision.17 In particu-
lar, a number of empirical studies suggest that taxpayers often dis-
count taxes that are not assessed until after a market decision has 
been made.18 In other words, taxpayers appear often to spotlight on 
the prices displayed at the time of market decisionmaking.  
2.   Ironing 
Ironing occurs when taxpayers incorrectly use their average tax 
rates when making market decisions rather than their marginal tax 
rates.19 In essence, ironing is a form of spotlighting behavior wherein 
taxpayers spotlight on their average tax rates when it would be more 
economically rational for the taxpayers to make decisions based on 
their marginal tax rates.  
B.   Political Salience 
Political salience refers to how the presentation of taxes affects po-
litical decisionmaking. For instance, certain tax instruments may 
have low political salience if voters discount tax costs imposed 
through these instruments when making voting decisions. A number 
of factors have been hypothesized to influence the political salience of 
taxation, including: indirect taxes, tax-system complexity, withhold-
ing, deficit financing, sticky baselines, and tax-label aversion.20  
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2268617.  
 15. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 26. 
 16. Id. at 27. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 27-31. 
 19. Id. at 31. 
 20. Id. at 34-54. 
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1.   Indirect taxes 
Indirect taxes refer to tax instruments for which the statutory in-
cidence falls on businesses or other intermediaries rather than on 
individual taxpayers.21 Even though at least a portion of the econom-
ic burden of indirect taxes falls on consumers in the form of higher 
prices, because voters do not personally remit these taxes they are 
alleged to have low political salience.22 In other words, according to 
the indirect-taxes hypothesis, the public may often ascribe the bur-
den of indirect taxes to the nominal payors, thus failing to account 
fully for taxes that the voting public does not explicitly pay. 
2.   Tax-system complexity 
The tax-system complexity hypothesis holds that the voting public 
may discount tax prices for which determining the overall tax price 
requires more complex calculations.23 For instance, many have al-
leged that breaking a tax price into a series of smaller payments as-
sessed over a period of time may reduce political salience as com-
pared to assessing a single aggregate tax price.24 It is also sometimes 
alleged that reducing the compliance costs of tax instruments may 
lower the political salience of those tax instruments.25  
3.   Withholding 
It is frequently alleged that the use of withholding mechanisms 
may lower the political salience of the withheld taxes.26 However, the 
existing literature is not entirely clear as to what it is about with-
holding that is thought to reduce political salience.27 It has been pos-
ited that breaking tax remittances into smaller regular payments 
may reduce the political salience of the tax liabilities.28 To the extent 
this is so, the withholding hypothesis can be thought of as a sub-
factor of the tax-system-complexity hypothesis. Alternatively, if tax 
liabilities subject to withholding are viewed more like money that is 
never received rather than a coercive extraction from the taxpayer’s 
income, then the withholding hypothesis may operate similar to the 
indirect-taxes hypothesis.29  
 21. Id. at 35. 
 22. Id. at 35-38. 
 23. Id. at 39-41. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 41-43. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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4.   Deficit financing 
The costs of deficit financing may be less politically salient than 
the costs of financing through current taxes.30 In a sense, the deficit-
financing hypothesis may operate like the market-salience hypothe-
sis for spotlighting, to the extent that the deficit-financing hypothesis 
operates through the separation in time between voting decisions and 
when the future tax liabilities are imposed.31  
5.   Sticky baselines 
The sticky-baselines hypothesis groups several sub-hypotheses 
that all stand for the principle that foregone tax cuts are less politi-
cally salient than are actual tax hikes.32 These sub-hypotheses in-
clude the flypaper effect, bracket creep, income elasticity, and the 
fiscal-volatility effect.33  
6.   Tax-label aversion  
The final political salience hypothesis is based on the notion that 
the mere labeling of a policy as a “tax” can reduce voter support for 
the policy. This general notion can be grouped into a number of relat-
ed sub-hypotheses, including: taxes versus other extractions, tax-
financed spending versus tax expenditures, and tax-financed spend-
ing versus regulation.34  
III.   OPERATIVE MECHANISMS 
There is considerable evidence that tax salience effects are real 
and that they are potentially important. However, the existing litera-
ture cannot yet offer clear predictions about how tax salience oper-
ates with respect to real-world tax instruments. In particular, the 
existing literature does not sufficiently analyze potential limiting fac-
tors to the hypotheses advanced about tax salience, and the litera-
ture thus cannot determine whether increased use of techniques for 
reducing tax salience would have the intended effect.35 Ultimately, 
our current understanding of both market salience and political sali-
ence remains largely speculative. 
 30. See id. at 43-45. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. at 45-49. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See id. at 49-54. 
 35. A key paper—Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: 
Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145 (2009)—does analyze limiting factors, but 
only within a bounded rationality model. See infra Part III.A. 
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One method for improving our understanding of tax salience is 
through empirical testing of discrete tax salience hypotheses—such 
as the research reviewed in my prior article with Darien Shanske 
and summarized in Part II of this Essay. I am hopeful that this ap-
proach will yield further insights, and I applaud scholars engaged in 
this form of research.36 However, testing of discrete hypotheses must 
be complemented with bigger-picture theorizing. An empirical study 
can only evaluate the predictions of a hypothesis as it relates to the 
particular circumstances giving rise to the experimental data. With-
out proper theoretical contextualizing, policy-minded scholars may 
inappropriately extrapolate the results of an empirical study to cir-
cumstances in which the results are unlikely to hold.37 
I continue to believe that tax salience has multiple dimensions 
and that market salience and political salience should be considered 
distinct concepts. Nevertheless, both market salience and political 
salience are likely to result from similar operative mechanisms. Both 
refer to how taxpayers perceive their tax burdens with respect to ei-
ther their market or political decisionmaking. Over the last couple 
decades, behavioral economists and decision-theory psychologists 
have developed a rich literature analyzing how consumers respond to 
price-shrouding techniques as employed by private-sector firms. This 
Part attempts to apply that consumer behavior literature to analyze 
potential operative mechanisms underlying both the market salience 
and political salience of taxation.38 
A strong finding of the consumer behavior literature is that mis-
perceiving prices does not necessarily imply underestimating prices.39 
When consumers are faced with convoluted price calculations in the 
private sector, they do not always underestimate the final price. In-
deed, depending on the details of how a price is made convoluted, 
consumers may overestimate the final price rather than underesti-
mating it.40 Consequently, it is naive to assume that taxpayers will 
 36. As noted earlier, supra note 7, I have engaged in this form of research myself. 
 37. Arguably, a primary goal of empirical research is to test hypotheses, so that the 
supported hypotheses can yield predictions outside of the contexts directly studied. Theo-
rizing about operative mechanisms and limiting factors can help refine hypotheses and 
generate new predictions to be tested through future empirical work. 
 38. My discussion here builds on similar work by others, including: Aradhna Krishna 
& Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as Price Presentation, 10 INT’L TAX 
& PUB. FIN. 189 (2003); Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 106 (2006). 
 39. Hyeong Min Kim & Luke Kachersky, Dimensions of Price Salience: A Conceptual 
Framework for Perceptions of Multi-Dimensional Prices, 15 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 
139, 139-40 (2006). 
 40. Vicki G. Morwitz, Eric A. Greenleaf, Edith Shalev & Eric J. Johnson, The Price 
Does Not Include Additional Taxes, Fees, and Surcharges: A Review of Research on Parti-
tioned Pricing 36 (July 26, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350004 (“[F]irms need to understand that partitioned pricing 
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necessarily underestimate their tax liabilities when faced with diffi-
cult tax calculations. If a taxpayer is aware of the existence of a tax 
instrument but has trouble calculating her tax liabilities, should she 
not just estimate her tax liability and use this estimate when making 
market and political decisions?  
This Part posits three potential explanations for what might cause 
taxpayers to (at least sometimes) underestimate their tax burdens. I 
label these mechanisms as: bounded rationality, time inconsistency, 
and framing effects. These mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. 
Methods for attempting to reduce tax salience may function through 
multiple or even all of these mechanisms. Nevertheless, determining 
which operative mechanisms potentially underlie empirical findings 
of tax salience is important both for generating hypotheses to be test-
ed through future empirical research and for predicting the robust-
ness of the empirical findings to limiting factors. Moreover, determin-
ing which operative mechanisms underlie observed tax salience effects 
may also be important for assessing their normative implications.   
A.   Bounded Rationality 
Bounded rationality refers to explanations wherein taxpayers ra-
tionally allocate scarce cognitive resources.41 Once we recognize that 
taxpayers have limited time, energy, willpower, or other cognitive 
resources, it becomes manifestly obvious that taxpayers will not al-
ways perform all of the calculations needed to accurately assess the 
tax implications of their decisions. In their seminal paper on the 
market salience of taxation, Chetty, Looney, and Kroft presented an 
influential model of bounded rationality.42 Their model predicts that 
taxpayers will be more likely to spotlight on immediately available 
price components (e.g., ignoring taxes that are not assessed until af-
ter the time of market decisionmaking) when making small, repeated 
purchases, and when tax rates are low.43 Conversely, their model 
predicts that consumers will be more likely to calculate aggregate 
(post-tax) prices when making large, one-time purchases, or when tax 
rates are high.44 The underlying notion is that consumers are more 
likely to expend the time and effort to calculate post-tax prices when 
more is at stake in their doing so. Effectively, Chetty, Looney, and 
benefits firms in many situations, but certainly not in all situations. . . . If some or all of 
these factors are absent, however, partitioned pricing can have no positive impact, or even 
a negative one.”). 
 41. See generally Matthew D. Adler, Bounded Rationality and Legal Scholarship 
(Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-03, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095874. 
 42. Chetty et al., supra note 35. 
 43. See id. at 1149-64. 
 44. See id. at 1175-76. 
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Kroft’s bounded-rationality approach models consumers as trading 
off between making tax-efficient purchasing decisions and expending 
the cognitive effort required to calculate post-tax prices. 
Within a bounded-rationality framework, the more complicated a 
tax calculation becomes, the less likely it becomes that taxpayers will 
accurately assess their tax liabilities. This dynamic can affect politi-
cal salience as well as market salience. The more difficult it becomes 
to accurately assess tax burdens, as compared to how much the tax-
payer cares about making accurate political judgments, the less like-
ly that the taxpayer will expend effort to incorporate accurately tax 
information into her voting decisions.45 However, as I noted earlier, 
taxpayers do not necessarily respond to complicated tax calculations 
by underestimating their tax liabilities.46 If a taxpayer makes a 
rough estimate of the post-tax price of a market decision, or of the tax 
liability associated with a political decision, the taxpayer may well 
overestimate (rather than underestimate) the tax consequences.47  
Hence, to reduce tax salience under a bounded-rationality frame-
work requires doing more than just increasing complexity; a common 
strategy involves offering taxpayers a reference price that is lower 
than the total price.48 If the reference price is close enough to the to-
tal price and is significantly more available, taxpayers may be in-
duced to focus solely on the reference price rather than expending the 
effort to calculate the total price.49 Reference-price strategies can be 
 45. If voters care little about accurately incorporating tax information into their vot-
ing decisions, voting behavior may be especially prone to manipulation.  
 46. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40. 
 47. See Kim et al., supra note 39, at 139-40. 
 48. Id. at 140. 
 49. See id. at 139-40 (“This stream of research contends that consumers trade-off the 
benefits of accuracy with the costs of time and effort to process MDPs, and therefore they 
often underestimate total prices.”). In the consumer behavior literature, price-presentation 
strategies that involve making price calculations more complicated and then offering a 
reference price that is lower than the final price are called “price-partitioning strategies,” 
“reference-price strategies,” or “multi-dimensional-pricing strategies.” See, e.g., Chien-
Huang Lin, Shih-Chieh Chuang & Chaang-Yung Kung, The Presence of Reference Price: 
How Value Can Appear Convergent to Buyers and Sellers, 33 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER RES. 
237 (2006); Kim et al., supra note 39; Richard L. Ott & David M. Andrus, The Effect of Per-
sonal Property Taxes on Consumer Vehicle Purchasing Decisions: A Partitioned-
Price/Mental Accounting Theory Analysis, 28 PUB. FIN. REV. 134 (2000). There are many 
variations to this basic strategic approach. For instance, one variation involves offering a 
discount and then trying to make the discount appear as salient and large as possible, ra-
ther than trying to make surcharges to the reference price less salient. For a couple other 
variations: “bundling” consists of charging a single combined price for multiple distinct 
goods, while “options pricing” involves creating additional features that can be added to a 
base product for additional charge. Marco Bertini & Luc Wathieu, Research Note, Attention 
Arousal Through Price Partitioning, 27 MARKETING SCI. 236, 237 (2008). These variations 
may also have tax-salience analogs, particularly in the state and local government context 
where it is common to assess fees and user charges for various publically provided services 
as an alternative to taxation.  
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especially effective when there is a temporal gap between when the 
reference price is assessed and when the final price is charged.50 As 
DellaVigna notes, “[h]olding constant the informativeness, information 
that is further into the future (or past) is less likely to be salient.”51  
With regard to market salience, studies of the spotlighting hy-
pothesis found that taxpayers often discount taxes that are not as-
sessed until after market decisions are made.52 In other words, the 
price components available at the time of market decisionmaking 
may function as a reference price.53 The reference-price dynamic also 
provides a potential explanation for the ironing hypothesis. Non-
linear price schedules can be difficult to understand, and boundedly 
rational taxpayers may prefer to use a reference price rather than 
calculating their actual marginal tax rates when faced with a non-
linear price schedule. If taxpayers sometimes use their average tax 
burdens from prior time periods as a reference price for predicting 
their future tax liabilities, then this would result in ironing behavior.54 
With respect to political salience, the basic reference-pricing dy-
namic supports the indirect-taxes and deficit-financing hypotheses.55 
For indirect taxes, voters may use their direct tax burdens as a refer-
ence price, discounting the burdens of indirect taxes when reaching 
political judgments.56 Similarly, for deficit financing, voters may use 
their current tax burdens as a reference price, discounting the in-
creased future tax burdens needed to repay accrued debt.57  
 50. Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 315, 352 (2009).  
 51. Id. 
 52. See supra Part II.A. 
 53. For example, pre-sales-tax prices are close enough to aggregate post-sales-tax 
prices (as most states’ sales taxes have rates below ten percent) and are significantly more 
available due to their being posted on the store aisles such that boundedly rational con-
sumers may well decide it is not worth their time and effort to incorporate sales taxes into 
their purchasing decisions. See Chetty et al., supra note 35, at 1165-75. As another poten-
tial example, the time gap between when many income-tax-related decisions need to be 
made (December 31st) and when income taxes are calculated (April 15th) may reduce the 
market salience of decisions related to claiming income tax deductions and credits. 
 54. This explanation for ironing behavior is empirically supported by Feldman and 
Katuščák’s finding that taxpayers make market decisions partially based on their average 
income-tax rates from prior years, even controlling for the relationship between prior and 
current year tax status. See Naomi E. Feldman & Peter Katuščák, Should the Average Tax 
Rate Be Marginalized? (Charles Univ. Ctr. For Econ. Research & Graduate Educ., Acad. of 
Scis. of the Czech, Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 304, 2006), available at 
http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp304.pdf. 
 55. For political salience, scholars have typically used the terms “isolation effect” or 
“focusing effect” in place of “spotlighting” or “reference pricing,” but the underlying idea is 
the same. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Isolation Effects and the Ne-
glect of Indirect Effects of Fiscal Policies, 19 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 289, 290 (2006). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. at 297-300. 
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Within the consumer behavior literature, a potentially important 
variation on the basic reference-pricing strategy is sometimes called 
“pennies-a-day.”58 The idea is that if a total price can be divided into 
a series of smaller sub-prices assessed over a prolonged period of 
time, then it can become more difficult to calculate the aggregate fi-
nal price, and consumers may be induced to focus on the smaller pe-
riodic payments as a reference price. The pennies-a-day concept thus 
supports the tax-system-complexity hypothesis that tax instruments 
which levy many smaller payments over a period of time (e.g., sales 
taxes) may have lower political salience than tax instruments which 
levy fewer larger tax payments (e.g., property taxes). Krishna and 
Slemrod have speculated that this mechanism also supports the view 
that withholding reduces the political salience of the income tax.59   
Another potentially important variation on the reference-pricing 
strategy has been called the “metric effect.”60 Research has demon-
strated that individuals may react differently to prices depending on 
whether the prices are presented in dollar values or as percentages.61 
This metric effect manifests for both market salience and political 
salience. For market salience, displaying prices as percentages—
instead of in dollar values—appears to make prices seem lower when 
the percentages are small and to make prices seem higher when the 
percentages are large.62 When base prices are displayed in one format 
(either in dollar values or as percentages) and tax surcharges in an-
other format, this can increase the cognitive effort needed to calcu-
late aggregate prices and thereby make taxpayers more likely to 
spotlight on the reference price.  
For political salience, voters’ attitudes toward progressivity and 
other tax-policy topics appear to differ dramatically depending on 
whether tax liabilities are displayed in dollar amounts or as percent-
ages.63 Many voters appear to support progressivity “without having 
a strong sense about what progressivity means or about how much 
 58. Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 38, at 193. The pennies-a-day strategy may also 
function via the mechanisms of time-inconsistency and/or framing effects, as I will discuss 
further infra Part III.B–C. 
 59. Id. at 193-94. 
 60. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 38, at 113. 
 61. Id. at 114. 
 62. See, e.g., Timothy B. Heath, Subimal Chatterjee & Karen Russo France, Mental 
Accounting and Changes in Price: The Frame Dependence of Reference Dependence, 22 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 90, 96 (1995) (“A $50 savings probably sounds smaller when framed as a 1 
percent discount, and a $100 savings probably sounds larger when framed as a 50 percent 
discount.”); Morwitz et al., supra note 40, at 37. 
 63. See, e.g., McCaffery & Baron, supra note 38, at 113-14 (“Most strikingly, subjects 
gave systematically different answers on the basis of whether the question was asked us-
ing dollars or percentages . . . .”). 
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progressivity they favor.”64 For instance, “[u]nder the standard defi-
nitions, a ‘flat tax’ is defined as when all taxpayers pay the same per-
centage of their incomes in taxation, and a ‘progressive tax’ as when 
higher-income taxpayers pay a greater percentage of their incomes in 
taxation than do lower-income taxpayers.”65 But when tax liabilities 
are displayed in dollar values rather than as percentages, higher-
income taxpayers are shown as paying more in taxes than lower-
income taxpayers even under a flat tax. Ed McCaffery and Jon     
Baron have thus demonstrated that displaying tax distribution     
information in dollar values can dramatically reduce voters’ support  
for progressivity.66 
Overall, then, the bounded rationality framework provides a po-
tential operative mechanism for the hypotheses that have been for-
warded regarding both market salience and political salience, as dis-
cussed in Part II. However, alternative operational mechanisms may 
also explain and support these hypotheses. This Part thus proceeds 
to discuss two alternative operational mechanisms: time inconsisten-
cy and framing effects. 
B.   Time Inconsistency 
Within a bounded-rationality framework, temporal gaps can de-
crease tax salience by making it more difficult to calculate post-tax 
prices. Temporal gaps are also key to the time-inconsistency frame-
work, but the mechanism is not due to increasing the complexity of 
tax calculations. Instead, the time-inconsistency framework operates 
when taxpayers mispredict their future behavior or irrationally over-
discount the effects of a present decision on their future selves. 
More specifically, numerous laboratory and field experiments have 
demonstrated that individuals do not always discount the future im-
plications of their decisions as predicted by standard economic mod-
els.67 Individuals frequently engage in what is often called “hyperbol-
ic discounting” and apply a much higher discount rate when compar-
ing the present to the near future than when comparing two time pe-
riods in the future.68 As DellaVigna elaborates:  
[E]vidence suggests that discounting is steeper in the immediate 
future than in the further future. For example, the median subject 
in Thaler (1981) is indifferent between $15 now and $20 in one 
 64. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 83. 
 65. Id. at 83-84.  
 66. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 38, at 113-14. 
 67. See DellaVigna, supra note 50, at 318-23; Lee Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxa-
tion Over Time, 59 TAX L. REV. 1, 13-15 (2005). 
 68. David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 449 
(1997). 
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month (for an annual discount rate of 345 percent) and between 
$15 now and $100 in ten years (for an annual discount rate of      
19 percent).69 
Three related hypotheses have been forwarded to explain this hy-
perbolic-discounting behavior. First, taxpayers may simply not value 
the welfare of their future selves in the same fashion as they do the 
welfare of their present selves.70 An important philosophical ap-
proach associated with Derek Parfit argues that personal identity is 
not stable over time.71 The implications of this view are far from 
straightforward, and I will not attempt to do them justice in this Es-
say. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that if taxpayers care more 
about their present selves than their future selves, then a taxpayer 
operating at any specific moment in time may view the gap between 
her present self and her near-future self as considerably more im-
portant than the gap between her more-distant-future self and her 
self in a time period following that more-distant future.72 Hence, hy-
perbolic-discounting behavior may be caused by taxpayers valuing 
their present selves over their future selves. 
A second explanation for hyperbolic-discounting behavior is “self-
control problems.” Self-control problems operate when taxpayers 
make decisions inconsistent with their own judgments about welfare 
over time because they lack the willpower to refrain from immediate-
ly satisfying their present desires.73 Anyone who has consciously 
over-eaten when faced with a good meal or who has been unable to 
resist the in-the-moment temptations of candy, alcohol, or gambling, 
should understand what is meant by self-control problems. 
Finally, hyperbolic discounting may be due to an “optimism bias” 
wherein individuals make unrealistic predictions about their likely 
future behavior or about likely future conditions. For example, con-
sumers appear to regularly over-predict the amount they will exer-
cise in the future when purchasing health club memberships74 and to 
 69. DellaVigna, supra note 50, at 318. 
 70. See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Policy and Personal Identity over Time, 62 TAX L. REV. 
333 (2009). 
 71. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). 
 72. If taxpayers limit their conception of self to their present self but have partial-
altruistic preferences toward all of their future selves, they might well strongly prioritize 
the welfare of their present self over all future selves, but they might not strongly prioritize 
the welfare of a near-future self over a more-distant-future self. For further discussion 
more generally, see Daniel M. Bartels & Oleg Urminsky, On Intertemporal Selfishness: 
How the Perceived Instability of Identity Underlies Impatient Consumption, 38 J. CONSUM-
ER RES. 182 (2011). 
 73. DellaVigna, supra note 50, at 318-24. 
 74. Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, Contract Design and Self-Control: The-
ory and Evidence, 119 Q.J. ECON. 353, 373-77 (2004). 
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under-predict the amount they will borrow in the future when decid-
ing whether to open credit-card accounts.75 
Under all three explanations, hyperbolic discounting can lead tax-
payers to make choices in the moment that do not correspond with 
the taxpayers’ long-term preferences. If tax instruments are designed 
so as to create a temporal gap between when decisions regarding tax-
ation are made and when tax liabilities are imposed, the impact of 
the tax liabilities may become less salient. In effect, taxes can be de-
signed so as to facilitate present-oriented taxpayers exporting the tax 
consequences of their current decisions to their future selves.  
In regard to market salience, the time-inconsistency framework 
offers an alternative explanation for spotlighting behavior. Since 
most of the major empirical studies of spotlighting involved a tem-
poral gap between when the tax liabilities were assessed and when 
the market decisions were made, observed spotlighting behavior 
could be a result of taxpayers’ hyperbolically discounting their future 
tax liabilities. In contrast, the time-inconsistency framework on its 
own probably does not explain ironing behavior; the difficulty in as-
sessing non-linear price schedules probably does not result from tem-
poral gaps.76 With respect to political salience, the time-inconsistency 
framework offers clear support for the deficit-financing hypothesis. 
The deficit-financing hypothesis predicts that taxpayers tend to dis-
count the future tax liabilities that result from accrued debt. If tax-
payers engage in hyperbolic discounting with respect to future tax 
liabilities, then deficit financing should reduce the political salience 
of taxation. The time-inconsistency framework on its own probably 
does not support the other political salience hypotheses, which do not 
function based on time delays.77  
 75. Id. at 377-79.  
 76. Although time inconsistency on its own does not explain ironing behavior, time 
inconsistency may work in tandem with bounded rationality to jointly cause ironing behav-
ior. A boundedly rational taxpayer may be tempted to use her average tax rates rather 
than her marginal tax rates in order to avoid expending the cognitive resources necessary 
to calculate marginal tax rates. If there is a temporal gap between when tax rates are cal-
culated and when tax liabilities are imposed, then time inconsistency may exacerbate the 
temptation to avoid calculating marginal tax rates. For instance, taxpayers make market 
decisions that affect their income-tax liabilities throughout the year; many important in-
come-tax-relevant decisions must be made by December 31st, but income-tax forms are not 
due until April 15th. If bounded rationality tempts taxpayers to make income-tax-relevant 
decisions based on their average tax rates, time inconsistency can exacerbate these temp-
tations since the tax consequences will not be felt until after the decisions are made. 
 77. However, time inconsistency may magnify the effects of bounded rationality. If 
bounded rationality tempts taxpayers to focus on reference prices when making voting 
decisions, to avoid expending the cognitive resources needed to more accurately assess 
their tax liabilities, time inconsistency can increase these temptations to the extent that 
the fiscal consequences of voting decisions seem remote in time from the voting. 
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Determining whether a tax salience effect results from time incon-
sistency or from bounded rationality can be important because the 
two operative mechanisms may respond differently to limiting fac-
tors, such as the size of a tax liability.78 As with bounded rationality, 
there are limits to the operation of time inconsistency. Taxpayers 
who realize that they are prone to hyperbolic-discounting behavior 
may take steps to prevent their future selves from making decisions 
at the expense of their even-more-distant-future selves.79 Such tax-
payers might go so far as to sign contracts with third parties to bind 
the taxpayers’ future behavior.80 Or taxpayers may use cognitive 
mechanisms to restrict the present-focused desires of their future 
selves, in a sense forming contracts between the taxpayers’ selves at 
various points in time.81 We might hypothesize that the more fre-
quent and important a time-inconsistency scenario becomes, the 
more likely it becomes that taxpayers will take steps to prevent their 
future selves from engaging in hyperbolic-discounting behavior. 
However, many of the mechanisms taxpayers can use to overcome 
time-inconsistent behavior require the taxpayers to know in advance 
that they are subject to time inconsistency.82 When tax salience ef-
fects result from time inconsistency, the limiting factor of whether 
taxpayers can learn from experience may rise to central importance.83  
C.   Framing Effects 
The third potential operative mechanism, framing effects, might 
be thought of as a catch-all category for biases that do not operate 
 78. See infra Part IV. 
 79. See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Self-Knowledge and Self-Regulation: An Eco-
nomic Approach, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS 137, 137 (Isabelle Brocas 
& Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (describing research on a variety of tools individuals can use 
to overcome time-inconsistent behavior). 
 80. See Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan & Wesley Yin, Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evi-
dence from a Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines, 121 Q.J. ECON. 635, 635-38 
(2006) (describing research on financial products that enable consumers to limit the discre-
tion of their future selves); Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow™: 
Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. 164, 168-69 
(Supp. 2004) (explaining that employer-sponsored automatic-enrollment savings plans 
have been “remarkably successful”).  
 81. See Jess Benhabib & Alberto Bisin, Modeling Internal Commitment Mechanisms 
and Self-Control: A Neuroeconomics Approach to Consumption-Saving Decisions, 52 GAMES 
& ECON. BEHAV. 460, 462 (2005) (describing a model based on research in cognitive neuro-
science wherein individuals “have the ability to either invoke automatic processes that are 
susceptible to impulses or temptations, or alternative control processes which are immune 
to such temptations.”); see also Bénabou & Tirole, supra note 79.  
 82. See, e.g., Ashraf et al., supra note 80, at 636 (“If individuals with time-inconsistent 
preferences are sophisticated enough to realize it, we should observe them engaging in 
various forms of commitment (much like Odysseus tying himself to the mast to avoid the 
tempting song of the sirens).”). 
 83. See infra Part IV.B. 
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based on bounded rationality or time inconsistency. Looking back to 
our discussion of reference-price strategies under the bounded-
rationality paradigm, the hypothesis was that partitioning an aggre-
gate price into a lower reference price plus a tax surcharge makes it 
more difficult for consumers to calculate aggregate prices and thus 
tempts the consumers to instead make judgments using a reference 
price that is lower than the aggregate price. Yet the empirical find-
ings on reference pricing have also been analyzed using a framing-
effects approach. To the extent that framing effects is the operative 
mechanism, consumers form initial judgments and expectations 
based on the reference price and then allow these initial judgments 
and expectations to influence their perceptions of the aggregate 
price—even when the consumers do later fully calculate the aggre-
gate price. Several studies have found that reference-price strategies 
can bias value judgments even when consumers do calculate aggre-
gate (post-tax) prices.84 Biases that operate through individuals mak-
ing preliminary judgments based on incomplete information, and 
then allowing these preliminary judgments to color their final evalu-
ations even when they later receive complete information, are often 
called “anchoring biases.”85  
Anchoring may function as an alternative operative mechanism 
for all of the hypotheses that can be explained by the bounded-
rationality form of reference pricing. Consider first the market sali-
ence hypothesis of spotlighting. If taxpayers anchor on the spotlight-
ed reference price, even later showing the taxpayers their aggregate 
tax liabilities may not counteract the market salience effects of spot-
lighting. Similarly, if taxpayers first consider their historic average 
tax rates when making market decisions—following the ironing hy-
pothesis—they may anchor on this reference price such that later ex-
posure to marginal tax rates may not counteract the initial anchoring.  
Anchoring can likewise potentially explain all of the political sali-
ence hypotheses. If voters use their direct tax burdens or current tax 
burdens as reference-price proxies, then anchoring can produce polit-
ical salience effects even if the voters are later exposed to their indi-
rect or future tax burdens. Similarly, if voters use politicians’ votes 
as a form of reference-price proxy, anchoring may influence voting 
behavior even if the voters also note the impact on their tax burdens 
of the phenomena underlying the sticky-baselines hypotheses. Simi-
 84. See, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Anchoring, Activation, and the 
Construction of Values, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 115 
(1999); Robin M. Hogarth & Hillel J. Einhorn, Order Effects in Belief Updating: The Belief-
Adjustment Model, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1 (1992); Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, 
The Semantics of Anchoring, 86 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 234 
(2001); Morwitz et al., supra note 40, at 30-31. 
 85. See Hayashi et al., supra note 7, at 217. 
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larly, if the pennies-a-day strategy has an anchoring component, then 
the framing approach may support the notions that the political sali-
ence of taxation can be lowered by dividing an aggregate tax liability 
into a series of smaller payments collected over time or through the 
use of multiple smaller tax instruments in place of a single larger tax 
instrument. Withholding may also trigger anchoring responses by 
making it so that an aggregate tax liability is paid in small incre-
ments over time. Anchoring may thus provide support for the view 
that withholding reduces the political salience of taxation even when 
taxpayers are forced to later calculate their aggregate tax liabilities 
through annual income-tax filing.  
Consequently, anchoring can lead to the same behaviors as 
bounded rationality and may thus exacerbate the consequences of 
bounded rationality. But where anchoring plays a strong role, it may 
be far more difficult to restore tax salience. In the context of bounded 
rationality, forcing taxpayers to perform tax calculations should usu-
ally suffice to counteract salience effects.86 The anchoring phenome-
non is potentially more robust. The notion underlying anchoring is 
that the judgments taxpayers make using incomplete information are 
not always updated even if complete information later becomes 
available. Anchoring can be thought of as an even more extreme con-
sequence of limited cognitive resources than in the more standard 
bounded-rationality framework. Not only do taxpayers often forgo 
fully calculating their tax liabilities, but they also do not always up-
date their prior views and understandings even when they later re-
ceive better information than that which was available when the ini-
tial views and understandings were forged.  
In addition to anchoring, another potentially important framing-
effects bias is the “endowment effect,” well known to even casual 
readers of the behavioral economics literature. Under the standard 
endowment effect, individuals have been shown to assign more disu-
tility to “losses” than utility to equivalent “gains.”87 Whether a 
change in circumstances is coded as a loss or as the absence of a gain 
depends on the framing of the individual’s endowment. In regard     
to taxation, whether taxpayers perceive taxes as losses from their     
pre-tax endowments or as reduced gains from engaging in market 
transactions may determine whether the endowment effect comes 
into play.88 
 86. To counteract market salience, taxpayers should be forced to calculate aggregate 
tax prices. To counteract political salience, taxpayers should be forced to calculate the tax 
components of prices. See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 4, at 54-58. 
 87. See McCaffery & Baron, supra note 55, at 290; see also Edward J. McCaffery, Cog-
nitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1875 (1994). 
 88. See id. 
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Compare the political salience of the employer-paid and employee-
paid portions of the payroll tax. The employer-paid portion of the 
payroll tax is taken out before workers are told their salaries and 
thus is likely coded as smaller gains from working. In contrast, the 
employee-paid portion of the payroll tax is presented with the em-
ployees first seeing pre-tax salary totals and then being shown how 
much the government takes out of the pre-tax salary. The employee-
paid portion of the payroll tax is thus more likely to be coded as a 
loss. Income-tax payments may be even more likely to be coded as 
losses, as taxpayers are instructed to calculate their aggregate pre-
tax incomes before being told that the government will take a portion 
of this income figure from them.89 Hence, the endowment effect sup-
ports the indirect-taxes political salience hypothesis.90 If voters view 
direct taxes as losses and indirect taxes as forgone gains, then the 
use of direct taxes may trigger the endowment effect as compared to 
indirect taxes, thereby making indirect taxes less politically salient 
than direct taxes.91   
A related form of the endowment effect—often labeled as the sta-
tus-quo bias—may support the sticky-baselines political salience hy-
potheses. If voters understand the tax laws on the books to constitute 
the status quo and view politicians’ votes to change these laws as de-
partures from the status quo, then any votes to raise taxes may be 
coded as losses, whereas the increased tax revenue generated by the 
phenomena underlying the sticky-baselines hypotheses may be 
viewed as the status quo.92 The endowment effect may also play a 
role in regard to the withholding political salience hypothesis. If 
withheld income is not incorporated into taxpayers’ endowments, 
 89. Related to the endowment effect, the framing of tax design might also affect 
whether tax payments are viewed as mandatory extractions or as voluntary payments. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that taxpayers are more averse to property taxes than to real 
estate transaction taxes. See Marika Cabral & Caroline Hoxby, The Hated Property Tax: 
Salience, Tax Rates, and Tax Revolts (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
18514, 2012). The standard endowment effect may explain this result if taxpayers view 
property taxes as coming from their pre-tax endowments and real-estate-transaction taxes 
as being extra amounts paid to purchase property. Yet in addition to being averse to losses, 
individuals may also be more averse to mandatory extractions than to voluntary payments. 
If real-estate-transaction taxes are viewed as resulting from the taxpayer’s choice to pur-
chase real estate, while property taxes are viewed as being unrelated to the taxpayer’s 
choices, then an aversion to mandatory extractions might come into play in addition to the 
endowment effect. Of course, property taxes also result from the choice to purchase proper-
ty, but taxpayers may view this connection as more tenuous. 
 90. McCaffery & Baron, supra note 55, at 290. 
 91. Id. More speculatively, the endowment effect could also lead voters to discount 
future tax liabilities—following the deficit-financing political salience hypothesis—if cur-
rent taxes are viewed as losses and future taxes as forgone gains. 
 92. For instance, see the discussion of state-level revenue volatility in David Gamage, 
Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
749, 799-801 (2010). 
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then taxpayers may be more politically averse to paying additional 
taxes at the end of the year than to having amounts withheld regu-
larly from their paychecks. 
The existence and importance of framing effects has been well 
demonstrated. The framing-effects approach is undoubtedly im-
portant for understanding tax salience. Unfortunately, the implica-
tions of framing effects are harder to predict than are the implica-
tions of bounded rationality or time inconsistency. Most crucially, it 
is more difficult to predict when individuals are likely to overcome 
the impact of framing effects. 
Research suggests that the market salience of at least some fram-
ing effects can be overcome through the use of agents.93 Taxpayers 
increasingly use accountants or software to guide them through diffi-
cult income-tax decisions.94 Wealthier taxpayers may rely on lawyers 
and financial advisers to assist with decisionmaking, particularly 
when large tax liabilities are at stake.95 Books and websites provide 
tools to assist even moderate-income taxpayers with weighing the tax 
and non-tax factors involved in making large purchases, such as for 
housing and automobiles.96 Similarly, with regard to political sali-
ence, voters’ opinions about taxation may depend more on the infor-
mation they receive from experts and from other trusted sources than 
from their direct experience with the tax system.97 Political experts 
 93. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, Endowment Effects With-
in Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002) (finding that subjects situ-
ated in agency relationships do not exhibit a significant endowment effect); John A. List, 
Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J. ECON. 41 (2003) (finding 
that market experience eliminates the endowment effect). 
 94. Marsha Blumenthal & Charles Christian, Tax Preparers, in THE CRISIS IN TAX 
ADMINISTRATION 201, 201-02 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004); Lawrence 
Zelenak, Essay, Complex Tax Legislation in the TurboTax Era, 1 COLUM. J. TAX L. 91, 94-
95 (2010). 
 95. See Blumenthal & Christian, supra note 94, at 203-04 (describing factors correlat-
ed with taxpayers being more likely to hire tax practitioners). 
 96. See, e.g., Auto Loan Application, DRIVERS LANE, http://www.driverslane.com/  
calculators/sales-tax-calc.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); Home Purchase Calculator, 
PLANNING TIPS, http://www.planningtips.com/cgi-bin/howmuch.pl (last visited Jan. 30, 
2014); Tax, Title, Tags, and Fees Calculator, CARMAX, http://www.carmax.com/enUS/tax-
title-tags-fees-calculator/default.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2014); TurboTax AnswerX-
change – For Tax Years 2008-2010 Only: Claiming the First-Time Homebuyer Tax Credit, 
TURBOTAX, http://turbotax.intuit.com/support/kb/tax-content/tax-tips/6360.html (last visit-
ed Jan. 30, 2014); Used Vehicle Tax Calculator, DMV.ORG, http://search.dmv.org/dmv/used-
vehicle-tax-calculator (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).  
 97. For instance, at the state level, the Tax Foundation’s “state business tax climate 
index” and “tax freedom day” rankings have had enormous influence. See State Tax and 
Spending Policy, TAX FOUNDATION,  http://taxfoundation.org/tax-topics/state-tax-and-
spending-policy (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). For criticisms of the methodologies underlying 
these rankings, see NICHOLAS JOHNSON, IRIS J. LAV & JOSEPH LLOBRERA, CTR. ON BUDGET 
& POLICY PRIORITIES, TAX FOUNDATION ESTIMATES OF STATE AND LOCAL TAX BURDENS ARE 
NOT RELIABLE (2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=133.  
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and other opinion leaders may function much like agents and soft-
ware do for market salience—allowing taxpayers to make more accu-
rate voting decisions about taxation even when the taxpayers’ direct 
observations about taxation are biased due to framing effects.  
Agents and opinion leaders may also assist taxpayers in overcom-
ing the impact of bounded rationality and time inconsistency. Yet 
agents and opinion leaders are likely to be even more crucial to fram-
ing effects, as it is less clear whether taxpayers can overcome fram-
ing effects without the use of agents. If taxpayers become aware that 
they are potentially susceptible to framing effects, and if they view 
the market or political decision as important enough, taxpayers may 
turn to agents or opinion leaders in order to overcome their impact.   
IV.   LIMITING FACTORS 
The existing literature is far from clear about the factors affecting 
tax salience or the circumstances in which these factors are likely to 
come into play. I have tried to clarify the literature by discussing 
three potential operative mechanisms for tax salience in order to pro-
vide a foundation for discussing the normative implications of tax 
salience and for generating hypotheses to be tested by future empiri-
cal work. Yet it is important to emphasize that there are limits to 
these operative mechanisms. I will thus discuss three key potentially 
limiting factors, beginning with the size of the tax liability in question. 
A.   Size of the Tax Liability 
The first limiting factor for tax salience that I will discuss is the 
size of a tax liability. How the size of a tax liability operates is most 
straightforward under a bounded-rationality framework, wherein 
increasing the size of a tax liability should generally increase taxpay-
ers’ incentives to calculate the tax liability accurately. The bounded-
rationality framework imagines taxpayers performing implicit cost-
benefit analyses when deciding whether to expend the required cog-
nitive resources. All else being equal, then, the more money at stake 
in calculating a tax liability, the more incentive taxpayers have to do 
so accurately.98  
Of course, all else is not always equal. The impact of the size of a 
tax liability depends on the opportunity cost of the taxpayer’s cogni-
tive resources. The more a taxpayer has to give up in order to assess 
a tax liability accurately, the less likely the taxpayer will be to per-
form the calculations. Moreover, with regard to political salience, 
 98. Hence, levying smaller taxes across a wide variety of transactions (as in retail 
sales taxes) may create less incentive for taxpayers to calculate their aggregate tax burden 
accurately than would levying a larger tax on a fewer number of transactions (as in excise 
taxes on luxury goods or real-estate-transaction taxes). See supra Part III.A. 
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taxpayers arguably have little at stake in making accurate voting 
decisions.99 Indeed, there is a large literature questioning why it is 
that individuals even bother to vote at all.100 Many have argued that 
individuals typically vote based on emotions and uninformed intui-
tions, rather than expending effort to process the information needed 
to vote rationally.101  
Yet regardless of whether voters process information based on log-
ic or intuition, there is substantial evidence that voter opinions do 
respond to changes in the size of tax burdens.102 The larger the size of 
a tax liability, the more information taxpayers are likely to receive 
about the tax instrument in question, whether the information comes 
from direct experience, from political-opinion leaders, or from the 
media. Even if voter judgments are largely emotional and intuitive, 
available evidence still suggests that voters are generally more 
averse to large tax liabilities then to small ones.103  
The impact of the size of a tax liability is less straightforward un-
der a time-inconsistency framework. If taxpayers realize in advance 
that they are subject to time inconsistency, taxpayers may take steps 
(either concrete or cognitive) to limit the discretion of their future 
selves.104 The size of a tax liability might then affect tax salience un-
der a time-inconsistency framework much as it does under a bound-
ed-rationality framework. The larger the size of a tax liability, the 
more incentive taxpayers would have to limit the discretion of their 
future selves. However, if taxpayers do not realize in advance that 
they are subject to time inconsistency, they may be unable to limit 
their future selves, and the relative size of a tax liability may have no 
effect on tax salience or may even increase the impact of tax salience.105  
It is hardest to predict how the size of a tax liability functions un-
der the framing-effects paradigm. The literature has yet to develop a 
sufficiently deep understanding of how framing effects operate for us 
 99. See, e.g., BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES 
CHOOSE BAD POLICIES (2007). 
 100. See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & LOREN LOMASKY, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE 
PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE (1993). 
 101. Id. 
 102. ANDREA CAMPBELL, HOW AMERICANS THINK ABOUT TAXES: PUBLIC OPINION AND 
THE AMERICAN FISCAL STATE (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4-5) (on file with author).  
 103. Id. 
 104. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
 105. The larger a tax liability, the more a present-self-focused taxpayer can gain by 
exporting tax consequences to the taxpayer’s future selves and the more tempting it may 
be for a taxpayer to succumb to self-control problems. Also,  optimism biases may have 
greater impact if taxpayers mispredict that they will be in a better position to deal with tax 
liabilities in the future. Hence, when taxpayers cannot limit the discretion of their future 
selves, increasing the size of a tax liability can potentially exacerbate time-inconsistency 
problems. 
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to assess confidently predictions about the relationship between 
framing effects and the size of a tax liability. Moreover, since this Es-
say uses the term “framing effects” as a catch-all category for biases 
that do not operate through bounded rationality or time inconsisten-
cy, different forms of framing effects may exhibit varied responses to 
the size of a tax liability. Nevertheless, I expect that framing effects 
respond to the size of a tax liability much as does time inconsistency. 
When taxpayers realize in advance that they are subject to framing 
effects, they may take steps to counteract them.106 If a tax liability 
becomes large enough, taxpayers may turn to agents or other third-
party assistance in order to incorporate tax information into their 
decisionmaking more accurately.    
Ultimately, how the size of a tax liability affects tax salience is 
highly interrelated with the extent to which taxpayers learn from 
experience with their tax environments. This is particularly true  
under the time-inconsistency and framing-effects paradigms, where 
taxpayers may be unable to de-bias themselves unless they know     
in advance that they are likely to make sub-optimal tax decisions. I 
will thus proceed next to discuss the limiting factor of learning     
from experience.   
B.   Learning from Experience 
Even when taxpayers cannot accurately assess a tax instrument 
directly, taxpayers may still note the connections between tax-
relevant decisions and the tax consequences following those deci-
sions.107 Through repeated exposure to the tax consequences of deci-
sions, taxpayers may develop a rough sense of what affects their ex-
pected future tax liabilities, even without understanding the tax-law 
mechanics of how these liabilities are calculated. In addition to learn-
ing from their own experiences, taxpayers may learn from the tax 
experiences of their friends, families, and acquaintances, or from sto-
ries in the media.108 In regard to political salience, taxpayers may 
learn by noting the consequences of tax-policy choices across different 
nations, states, or time periods.109 Taxpayers can also learn about 
 106. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text. 
 107. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Them-
selves, 3 ERASMUS L. REV. 93, 97-98 (2010) (arguing that seller interpretations of consumer 
mistakes exacerbates welfare costs associated with such mistakes); Alexander L. Brown, 
Zhikang Eric Chua & Colin F. Camerer, Learning and Visceral Temptation in Dynamic 
Saving Experiments, 124 Q.J. ECON. 197, 198 (2009) (explaining experimental results 
wherein subjects at first saved too little, but then learned to save near optimally after so-
cial learning). 
 108. One need only glance at any major newspaper either in December (before the close 
of the tax year) or in early April (before the April 15th income-tax filing date) to be bom-
barded by tax advice and discussions of the political impact of various tax provisions.  
 109. For instance, Americans who travel to Europe may note the higher prices Europe-
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taxation from experts or from other political actors. The impact of tax 
design on voting behavior may largely occur through a process 
whereby tax design influences the views of key opinion leaders who 
then preach to the larger population. 
Hence, the extent to which a tax environment is conducive to tax-
payer learning is a key factor in the operation of both market and 
political salience. Liebman and Zeckhauser outline several conditions 
relevant for whether individuals are likely to learn from experience, 
the most notable of which are: “delayed payoffs,” “bundled consump-
tion,” and “false signals.”110  
Delayed payoffs refer to when the tax consequences of a decision 
are not felt until a long time period after the decision is made.111 It 
becomes more difficult to learn from the consequences of a tax-
relevant decision when those consequences do not occur for a long 
time period, both because more time will have elapsed before any po-
tential learning can take place and because the decision is likely to 
become less salient over time, thus weakening the perceived connec-
tion between the decision and its consequences.112 For example, there 
is a large literature analyzing how taxpayers respond to tax incen-
tives for retirement savings.113 Because most taxpayers only retire 
once, well after their peak earning years, taxpayers have little oppor-
tunity to learn from observing the consequences of their earlier re-
tirement-savings decisions. Taxpayers are thus far less likely to learn 
about the impact of taxes on their retirement decisions than on their 
everyday work and consumption decisions. 
Bundled consumption refers to when the consequences of one deci-
sion are intermingled with the consequences of other decisions.114 The 
ans pay for comparable goods and learn that these price differences are (at least partially) 
due to European value added taxes (VATs). 
 110. Jeffrey B. Liebman & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Schmeduling 5-6 (Oct. 2004)       
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/jeffreyliebman/ 
schmeduling.pdf. In addition to the factors discussed in this Essay, Liebman and Zeck-
hauser also analyze the additional factors of “heterogeneity in offered schedules,” “obscure 
pricing units,” “nonstationary economic environment,” and “frequent revisions of sched-
ules.” Id. at 4-5. There are, of course, many other categorization schemas in the literature 
for factors affecting learning from experience. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Ferrari, supra note 107, 
at 97 n.11 (“Learning from one’s mistakes relies on timely, clear and painful feed-
back . . . .”); Colin F. Camerer, Comment on Noll and Krier, “Some Implications of Cognitive 
Psychology for Risk Regulation,” 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 791, 794 (1990) (“Studies show that 
learning is difficult unless feedback is clear, frequent, and quick.”).   
 111. Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 110, at 5. 
 112. This condition is related to how temporal gaps can induce bounded rationality by 
making it more difficult to predict the tax consequences of a decision. But as a factor affect-
ing taxpayer learning from experience, delayed payoffs operates ex post rather than ex ante 
(affecting after-the-fact learning rather than before-the-fact calculations). 
 113. See Olivia Mitchell & Stephen Utkus, Lessons from Behavioral Finance for Re-
tirement Plan Design 35 (Pension Research Council, Working Paper No. 2003-6, 2003). 
 114. Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 110, at 5. 
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more difficult it becomes to identify which of many tax-related choic-
es caused a particular outcome, the harder it becomes to learn about 
the connections between choices and outcomes. For example, the in-
come-tax benefit produced by making a charitable contribution de-
pends on how much the taxpayer claims for other itemized deduc-
tions. If a taxpayer claims different amounts in itemized deductions 
across different tax years, it may become difficult to learn from      
experience how much income-tax benefit is received by making a 
charitable contribution. 
Finally, the condition of false signals refers to when taxpayers re-
ceive potentially misleading information following a tax-relevant de-
cision.115 When economic circumstances change over time, taxpayers 
may incorrectly associate tax decisions with outcomes caused by ex-
ternal events. Likewise, taxpayers who have idiosyncratic tax profiles 
may learn incorrect lessons from their friends, acquaintances, or the 
media. For instance, learning about deficit financing may be obscured 
by the tendency for deficits to rise during recessions and shrink dur-
ing periods of economic growth. When deficit-financed tax cuts (or 
spending hikes) are made during economic downturns, voters may 
see deficits shrink as the economy recovers and thus conclude that 
the tax cuts (or spending hikes) did not negatively affect the govern-
ments’ debt levels.  
On their own, the conditions of delayed payoffs, bundled consump-
tion, and false signals are neither necessary nor sufficient for taxpay-
er learning. My discussion of these conditions is aimed at outlining a 
few important considerations for whether learning from experience is 
likely, but this discussion is by no means exhaustive. Nevertheless, 
when conditions are conducive to learning, and when the size of a tax 
liability becomes large enough, I expect taxpayer learning to at least 
partially counteract the effects of both market and political salience. 
Indeed, the ironing hypothesis for market salience is based on the 
notion that taxpayers learn from their experience with tax rate 
schedules but then develop an imperfect ability to predict future con-
sequences (as non-linear pricing schedules cause marginal rates to 
differ from average rates). Any discussion of tax salience that does 
not evaluate the possibility of taxpayer learning is unlikely to yield 
useful predictions for real-world taxpayer behavior. 
Taxpayer learning is particularly important for understanding tax 
salience under the time-inconsistency and framing-effects models. 
The existing literature has not fully determined the extent to which 
taxpayers can de-bias themselves from the consequences of time in-
consistency or framing effects. To the extent taxpayers can de-bias 
themselves directly, the likelihood of taxpayer learning should work 
 115. Id. at 5-6. 
                                                                                                      
198  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:173 
 
together with the size of the tax liability to increase taxpayers’ incen-
tives for de-biasing.116 But even when taxpayers cannot de-bias them-
selves directly, they may turn to agents, third-party tools, or market 
mechanisms to improve their tax decisionmaking. The likelihood of 
taxpayer learning and the size of a tax liability should thus work to-
gether to increase taxpayers’ motivations for de-biasing, regardless of 
whether taxpayers can de-bias themselves directly or only through 
the use of third-party assistance.117 
Might some instances of framing effects be immune to de-biasing 
even through the use of third-party tools and agents? If so, tax-design 
techniques drawing on these framing effects could be sufficiently ro-
bust so as to be insurmountable even were governments to engage in 
massive use of these techniques under conditions where taxpayers 
could easily learn from experience. The existing literature does not 
rule out this possibility, yet I am skeptical. Framing effects function 
through how prices are displayed. I see no reason why agents or 
third-party tools could not train taxpayers to perceive tax prices us-
ing alternative frames. Reframing techniques may not fully counter-
act framing effects, but reframing techniques should enable taxpay-
ers to perceive at least a portion of the costs of taxation.118 And per-
ceiving even a portion of these costs should affect taxpayer behavior 
for sufficiently large tax liabilities.    
Consequently, my intuition suggests that the potential for gov-
ernments to employ low-salience tax designs depends largely on 
whether conditions are conducive to taxpayer learning. Where condi-
tions are not conducive to learning, governments may have wide dis-
cretion to manipulate both forms of tax salience. Deficit financing is 
perhaps the most obvious example. Learning about deficit financing 
is hindered by delayed payoffs, bundled consumption, and false sig-
nals.119 As such, taxpayers may not learn to incorporate the effects of 
deficit financing into their market or political decisions, even if gov-
ernments engage in massive use of deficit financing.120   
 116. The easier it is for taxpayers to learn from experience, the less costly de-biasing is 
likely to be. 
 117. When faced with important decisions with large consequences, taxpayers should 
often be more likely to take the time and incur the costs of seeking expert advice or other-
wise acting so as to counteract salience effects.  
 118. For instance, anchoring biases function through taxpayers under-adjusting to new 
information. As under-adjustment does not imply non-adjustment, new information still 
partially improves taxpayers’ understandings of tax prices.  
 119. The negative effects of unsustainable deficit financing are not felt until long after 
the initial use of deficit financing; the impacts of deficit financing are intermingled with 
numerous other economic policy choices and with the effects of the political dynamics that 
first led to the deficit financing. Also, deficit financing may produce false signals when the 
impact of deficit financing is entangled with the effects of the economic cycle.  
 120. Whether bond markets can be fooled as easily as voters is another question.  
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In contrast, I expect that governments are more limited in their 
ability to reduce market salience through the use of retail sales taxes 
or to reduce political salience through the use of indirect taxes. If 
sales-tax rates were made high enough, I expect that consumers 
would take greater note of the additional sales-tax charges added at 
store registers. And evidence from comparing voter opinions across 
time periods and jurisdictions supports our expectation that increas-
ing the use of indirect taxes heightens voter attention to these taxes.121  
None of this is to suggest that governments cannot reduce tax sa-
lience when the environment is conducive to taxpayer learning or 
that governments can completely reduce tax salience when the envi-
ronment is not conducive to learning. The impact of taxpayer learn-
ing is a matter of degrees, not absolutes. I have argued that both the 
size of a tax liability and the conduciveness of an environment to 
taxpayer learning tend to inhibit the effectiveness of tax-design tech-
niques aimed at reducing market or political salience. However, the 
magnitudes of these effects remain unanswered empirical questions.   
C.   Aversion to Being Manipulated 
Further underscoring the complexity of how tax salience plays out 
in the real world, there is ample evidence from the consumer behav-
ior literature that consumers react negatively if they perceive them-
selves as being manipulated. For instance, field studies have shown 
that the impact of price-presentation techniques can disappear if 
consumers become skeptical of vendors’ intentions or come to believe 
that vendors are using misleading price-presentation strategies.122 
More generally, the empirical evidence suggests that moderate use of 
techniques for reducing price salience is often more effective than 
high use—as high use can lead to consumer backlash.123   
As applied to tax salience, these findings imply that taxpayers’ 
perceptions of being manipulated place an additional limiting factor 
on techniques for reducing both the market and political salience of 
taxation. If taxpayers come to believe that the government is actively 
trying to reduce the market salience of taxes, the taxpayers may 
begin to look through devices for reducing market salience or even to 
anticipate non-salient (“hidden”) taxes where none are present. If 
 121. CAMPBELL, supra note 102. 
 122. Robert M. Schindler, Maureen Morrin & Nada Nasr Bechwati, Shipping Charges 
and Shipping-Charge Skepticism: Implications for Direct Marketers’ Pricing Formats, 19 J. 
INTERACTIVE MARKETING 41, 44-45 (2005); Morwitz et al., supra note 40, at 20. 
 123. Yih Hwai Lee & Cheng Yuen Han, Partitioned Pricing in Advertising: Effects on 
Brand and Retailer Attitudes, 13 MARKETING LETTERS 27, 28-29 (2002); Shibin Sheng, 
Yeqing Bao & Yue Pan, Partitioning or Bundling? Perceived Fairness of the Surcharge 
Makes a Difference, 24 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 1025, 1039 (2007); Morwitz et al., supra 
note 40, at 26-27. 
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taxpayers perceive the government as attempting to reduce the polit-
ical salience of taxation, taxpayers may become more resistant to 
supporting taxes (or to supporting politicians who favor taxes) in 
their voting decisions.124 Moreover, taxpayers’ aversion to being ma-
nipulated through market-salience techniques can affect the taxpay-
ers’ political decisionmaking, and vice versa. If taxpayers become 
hostile toward the governments’ attempts to reduce the market sali-
ence of taxation, they may react against all taxes in their voting deci-
sions. Conversely, if taxpayers becomes angry about the government’s 
attempts to reduce the political salience of taxation, they may become 
more tax-averse (or less tax-accepting) in their market behavior.125  
The empirical literature on aversion to being manipulated is al-
most entirely focused on how consumers respond to price-
presentation techniques as employed by private-sector firms. Yet 
there is reason to suspect that aversion to being manipulated plays 
at least as strong a role with respect to tax salience. The media gen-
erally covers politics more attentively than it does the behavior of 
private-sector firms, and scandalous-seeming political behavior tends 
to make for good copy. This is not meant to suggest that governments 
are unable to employ techniques for reducing tax salience. Govern-
ments clearly do not design taxes to be as salient as possible.126 How-
ever, as with private-sector firms, governments may find that moder-
ate attempts to reduce tax salience are more effective than aggressive 
attempts, as the aggressive attempts may backfire.    
Complicating matters, taxpayers’ aversion to being manipulated 
may be more a function of the perceived intent behind government 
actions rather than a direct function of the design of the tax system. 
Hence, taxpayers’ aversion to being manipulated does not necessarily 
play out differently depending on which of the three operative mech-
anisms is dominant. Whether taxpayers perceive themselves as being 
manipulated works somewhat independently of the mechanism by 
which taxpayers are (or are not) manipulated. Indeed, taxpayers’ 
hostility may depend as much on how the media reports on tax-
design techniques as on the nature of the techniques themselves. I 
therefore expect that governments have much greater scope for re-
 124. For an example of this phenomenon, see Adam Nagourney & David M. Herszen-
horn, Republicans Call Health Legislation a Tax Increase, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2009), 
www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/health/policy/02tax.html (describing Republican attacks on 
Obama’s health care reform proposal based on allegations that the proposal contains “hid-
den” tax increases). 
 125. If hostility toward the use of political salience techniques engenders tax-averse 
preferences, taxpayers may be less likely to engage in taxable transactions or more likely 
to underreport their income or engage in other forms of tax evasion. For a discussion of the 
connection between tax salience and tax-averse preferences, see Gamage & Shanske, supra 
note 4, at 50. 
 126. See Krishna & Slemrod, supra note 38. 
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ducing tax salience when the techniques employed for doing so are 
primarily directed toward other purposes. 
For instance, imagine what might happen were a future U.S. Pres-
ident to explicitly support an expansion of the Alternative Minimum 
Tax (AMT) on the grounds that the effective tax-rate hikes caused by 
expanding the AMT would be less salient to both voters and market 
participants than would raising income-tax rates directly. It is hard 
to imagine Congress approving an AMT expansion openly supported 
as a means of making the income tax less salient. But even if the ex-
pansion could be passed into law, we might expect that taxpayers’ 
aversion to being manipulated would counteract much (if not all) of 
the salience-reducing effects of the AMT expansion.127   
Conversely, imagine a future U.S. President supporting an AMT 
expansion with the stated goal of preventing high-income taxpayers 
from negating most of their tax liabilities through aggressive exploi-
tation of tax credits and deductions.128 The President’s political oppo-
nents might claim that the true goal of the proposed AMT expansion 
was to reduce tax salience. But if taxpayers found the President’s po-
sition credible—believing that the AMT expansion was actually in-
tended to combat aggressive tax planning—the expansion would be 
far less likely to trigger taxpayers’ aversion to being manipulated. All 
else being equal, attempts to reduce tax salience are more likely to be 
successful when the salience-reducing features of a tax reform are 
plausibly viewed as a side effect of a reform aimed at other purposes, 
rather than as the primary goal of the reform. 
Taxpayers’ aversion to being manipulated should generally work 
in concert with the other limiting factors—the size of a tax liability 
and learning from experience. After all, taxpayers can only react 
against the use of salience-reducing techniques if they know that 
these techniques are being employed. The larger the size of a tax lia-
bility, the more likely that taxpayers will take note of the tax liability 
and become averse to any salience-reducing techniques used to ob-
scure it. Similarly, the easier it is for taxpayers to learn about a sali-
ence-reducing technique through experience, the more likely that 
taxpayers will perceive themselves as being manipulated. Particular-
ly when tax liabilities are large and conditions are conducive to 
 127. Taxpayers’ aversion to being manipulated could more than counteract the sali-
ence-reducing effects. If taxpayers’ preferences became sufficiently more tax-averse, the 
AMT expansion could increase the market distortions caused by taxation. Similarly, if 
taxpayers became more distrustful of taxes in their role as voters, the AMT expansion 
might increase political resistance to taxation. 
 128.  AMT has generally been supported on these grounds. See COMM. ON FIN., TAX 
EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 108 (1982) (“The 
committee has amended the present minimum tax provisions applying to individuals with 
one overriding objective: no taxpayer with substantial economic income should be able to 
avoid all tax liability by using exclusions, deductions and credits.”). 
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learning, governments may thus find that moderate use of tech-
niques for reducing tax salience are more effective than high use.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
I have argued in this Essay (building on my prior article with Dar-
ien Shanske) that the existing tax salience literature is not yet suffi-
ciently developed to offer concrete tax policy prescriptions. However, 
the literature on tax salience is advancing rapidly. I am thus hopeful 
that the tax salience literature will be made policy-ready before too 
long. Despite my conclusions about the state of the existing litera-
ture, I remain optimistic that the study of tax salience will prove to 
be one of the most important paths through which future scholarly 
advances can guide the improvement of tax policy. 
Importantly, that we currently lack the information needed to 
predict with confidence the circumstances in which tax salience ef-
fects are likely to manifest does not imply that normative scholars 
should simply ignore the possibility of tax salience effects. Normative 
prescriptions that hold only in the absence of tax salience effects are 
just as likely to prove erroneous as are prescriptions that are based 
on the assumption that tax salience effects will strongly manifest de-
spite the possibility of limiting factors.129 The available evidence sug-
gests that tax salience effects are real and that these effects are po-
tentially important in at least some policy contexts. 
Instead, humility is the appropriate reaction to the nascent state 
of the tax salience literature. There is currently little that scholars 
can say with confidence about whether and when tax salience effects 
are likely to be important. 
Hopefully, this Essay’s analysis of potential operative mechanisms 
and limiting factors will aid in the development of a more refined lit-
erature on tax salience—a literature that may one day be capable of 
offering concrete policy recommendations. Moreover, although this 
Essay has focused on evaluating the circumstances under which tax 
salience effects are likely to manifest, this Essay’s analysis may also 
aid the development of the literature on the normative implications 
of tax salience. When taxpayers’ expressed preferences are manipu-
 129. For instance, a number of influential arguments based on optimal tax theory as-
sume that taxpayers will make labor decisions based on fully factoring in the price implica-
tions of excise taxes, capital-income taxes, and other tax and regulatory burdens that re-
duce the purchasing power of the money that taxpayers earn. Yet as Christine Jolls has 
speculated, it seems plausible to me that in many contexts these price effects may be sig-
nificantly less salient for these decisions than are labor-income taxes. For further discus-
sion, see Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1669-73 (1998); David Gamage, On Double-Distortion Arguments, 
Distribution Policy, and the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments II.B.4 (Sept. 25, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).  
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lable through salience effects, the question arises as to what are tax-
payers’ “true preferences”—which of the multiple possible sets of ex-
pressed preferences should be most respected? These questions are 
especially important with respect to political salience, under the 
thought that democratic institutions should be designed so as to re-
spect voters’ desires. But these questions also arise with respect to 
market salience, to the extent that policies are designed based on di-
vergences between taxpayers’ market decisions and taxpayers’ pref-
erences regarding the consequences of their market decisions. For 
these sorts of questions, assessing the normative implications of    
salience effects requires understanding the operative mechanisms 
underlying them. 
In any case, it is my hope that by the bicentennial anniversary of 
the income tax,130 scholarly literature building on the currently nas-
cent study of tax salience will have dramatically improved our under-
standing of how taxpayers respond to taxation. Models based on per-
fect economic rationality have generated powerful insights. But there 
can be little doubt that taxpayer behavior often departs from the as-
sumption of perfect economic rationality. Ultimately, the study of tax 
salience must be a key part of our examination of taxpayer behavior. 
Even if we do not yet have the tools to answer fully questions related 
to tax salience, the importance of these questions demands continued 
scholarly attention. 
  
 130. Of course, this is assuming that the income tax survives for another hundred 
years. But even if the U.S. income tax no longer exists—or even if the U.S. no longer ex-
ists—we can reasonably expect that taxation will probably still exist one hundred years 
from now and that it will thus remain important to understand taxpayer behavior. 
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